Capitalizing China by Chenggang Xu
   
Page 1 
 
   
Discussion on “China’s Financial System: Opportunities and Challenges” 
by Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Chenying Zhang, Mengxin Zhao 
Chenggang Xu 
University of Hong Kong and WCU-SNU 
25 October 2010 
This paper provides an excellent overview of China’s financial system from a cross country comparative 
perspective. It is very insightful and informative that I have learned a lot from this paper. But my job is to 
provide critical comments, which are in the following.   
One of the most distinctive features of Chinese economy and China’s financial system is regional 
heterogeneity and importance of regional governments. Although can be quite consistent with the 
arguments made by the paper, this is the weak point of the paper. National aggregate or average figures 
miss the feature. At national level, Chinese economy is larger than the whole of Latin America (China’s 
total GDP is $3.4 trillion vs. Latin America GDP $2.4 trillion, 2007). However, China’s regional 
heterogeneity in development etc., is a lot larger than that of the Latin America. The per capita GDP in 
the richest China region, Shanghai, is 9.6 times of that of the poorest region, Guizhou. As a comparison, 
the per capita GDP of Chile, the richest in Latin America, is 7.3 times of Bolivia, the poorest in Latin 
America. Most Latin American countries are about the average size of a Chinese prefecture. At that level, 
the regional disparity in China will be ten times higher than that in Latin America.  
This paper is almost silent on the basic governance structure of China’s financial system. The Chinese 
economy is featured by centralized personnel control and decentralized regional operations (Xu, 2010). 
Although China’s banking and financial markets are more centralized than other sectors, they still share 
the same basic feature. The central-local games determine the operation of the financial system. These 
games deeply affect the finance of most projects. Sub-national governments’ influences were prevalent 
and are not negligible in lending decisions of local branches of major banks; and they are important 
players of financial market regulation. 
A central theme of this paper is to find out whether China’s financial system “will stimulate or 
hamper its economic growth.” But the question is yet to be addressed by systematic empirical evidence. 
Concerning the formal financial sector, by using nationwide firm level census data and provincial bank 
lending data, Demetriades et al. (2008) find huge regional variations in regional financial development, 
measured by total loans to private sector over GDP ratio. They find everything else being equal, firms 
located in provinces with better financial development have significantly higher TFP growth rates and 
vice versa. And in general, China’s banking system contributes to Chinese firms’ TFP growth. This 
discovery is consistent with the market performance of the major Chinese commercial banks.  But one has 
to be very careful on these observations since these are based on an upside of the cycle in the Chinese real 
sector since the year 1999. During this period of time, the interest rate has been very low. What will 
happen in the downside of the cycle when the interest rate goes up substantially is yet to be known.     
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  Concerning the informal sector, intrigued by the township-village enterprise (TVE) development, 
major alternative mechanisms beyond the formal legal system has been discussed since long ago (e.g. 
Weitzman and Xu, 1994). There are huge cross region variations in culture and on the level of trust in 
doing business that some distinctive local business culture (without formal law) can be traced back to one 
thousand years ago, i.e. the Song Dynasty. These coincide well with local TVE development in the 1980s 
and the 1990s; and also coincide well with today’s development of hundreds of town-based world 
factories, i.e. local industrial cluster developments (Xu, 2010). Here, the key point is that alternative 
mechanisms are local and most Chinese towns are not well developed. Thus, it could be misleading to 
talk China as one phenomenon. 
When discussing financial crisis, the paper ignores an important fact: China is the only major 
economy which has largely escaped from the 1997 East Asia and the 2008 global financial crises. These 
“lucks” are not accidental and are worth to explore.  A key mechanism for escaping from the 1997 crisis 
is the capital account control. In addition to this, another key mechanism for China to escape from the 
2008 crisis is that asset-backed securities have never been allowed to be originated or to be traded in 
China. Should or should not China keep controlling capital account and should or should not China keep 
banning financial innovations, these are critically important issues for China’s forthcoming financial 
reforms.  
The paper points out rightly the importance of venture capital (VC), “China should develop active 
venture capital and private equity markets.” However, it does not discuss the extraordinary development 
of China’s VC sector and serious problems the sector faces. Since the late 1990s, with a rapid 
development in VC, now China has become the second most active economies in the world in attracting 
VCs after the US. China has the 2
nd largest VC investment in the world since 2008; in that year, the VC 
investment in China is equivalent to the 1994 level of the US; China’s VC/GDP ratio is about half of that 
of the US; and 62% VC investments are in high tech sectors. Nevertheless, the VC sector development in 
China faces serious institutional problems. About two third of VC investments in China are from foreign 
VCs, mostly US. Although no serious governance problems, the foreign VCs are not allowed to raise 
funds in China. Whereas the Chinese domestic VCs face much worse institutional constraints in 
determining their corporate governance structure (Guo, 2009).   
My last comment is about the claim of the paper that “[t]he role of deposits from government 
agencies and organizations has steadily decreased over time.” But many research papers, and reports by 
the world-bank and the Chinese government document an opposite that the share of government and 
enterprise deposits in total deposits has increased; and the share of household in total deposits has 
decreased (e.g. Bai, 2009). In fact, this has been a major concern for Chinese policy makers and there are 
lots of policy debates on what to do in dealing with this trend.  
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